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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Climate change induced sea-ice melting and the consequent opening of sea routes 
in the Arctic have increased the chances of interaction between shipping or 
resource development activities and traditional uses of sea (and sea-ice) by 
indigenous peoples in the Arctic.1 In the Pacific, climate change coupled with 
resource development activities is adversely impacting indigenous peoples’ 
relationship with the ocean on which they have depended for millennia.2 Bearing 
                                              
1 See the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report (AMSA), PAME, Arctic Council, especially the 
chapter on Human Dimensions, available online: < https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/54>. 
2 See “Study on the relationship between indigenous peoples and the Pacific Ocean,” Note by the Secretariat, 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, United Nations Economic and Social Council E/C.19/2016/3, dated 19th 
February 2016, available online: 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/C.19/2016/3&referer=/english/&Lang=E>.  
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in mind the close ties that indigenous peoples have with the ocean, and also the 
emergence of a new field of law relating to the rights of indigenous peoples, in 
this article we will explore the possible convergence between international 
indigenous rights law and the law of the sea, most especially through their 
flagship instruments, respectively, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)3 adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) in 2007 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS).4 The enquiry will be a theoretical one and the general 
reader might question the basis for it given the different subject-matter and status 
of the two instruments: UNDRIP is a UN General Assembly resolution in the 
field of international human rights law, whreas UNCLOS is an international 
multilateral convention governing the world’s oceans. At the outset we recognize 
that as a think-piece, this article does not address all the possible issues arising 
from such a novel relationship and that further scholarly research will be 
necessary. 
 
UNDRIP recognizes urgent needs that include respect and promotion of the 
inherent rights of indigenous peoples, especially their rights to self-determination, 
and rights affirmed in treaties, agreements and other arrangements with States, 
control of their lands, territories and resources, and respect for indigenous 
knowledge, cultures and traditional practices which contribute to sustainable and 
equitable development and proper management of the environment.5 In some 
situations, the agreements between indigenous peoples and States are “matters of 
international concern, interest, responsibility and character.” Similar to the 
                                              
3 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGA Res 61/295, UN Doc. A/RES/61/295, 
adopted 13th September 2007 (hereafter cited as UNDRIP), available online: 
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf>. For an authoritative commentary, see Jessie 
Hohmann and Marc Weller, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary, Oxford 
Commentaries on International Law (Oxford University Press, 2018) (hereafter cited as "UNDRIP Commentary"). 
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted 10 December 1982 (entered into force 16 November 
1994), 1833 UNTS 397 (hereafter cited as UNCLOS). 
5 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, preamble. 
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Universal Declaration on Human Rights,6 UNDRIP sets out its provisions as a 
“standard of achievement.”7 UNDRIP provides that “[T]he United Nations, its 
bodies, including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and specialized 
agencies, including at the country level, and States shall promote respect for and 
full application of the provisions of this Declaration and follow up the 
effectiveness of this Declaration.”8 The scope of the instrument is lands, 
territories, waters and coastal seas and the provisions include matters such as 
resource rights and environment protection.9   
 
The UNDRIP scope appears to overlap with the spatial and functional 
concerns of UNCLOS. The mission of UNCLOS was to settle “all issues relating 
to the law of the sea and … be an important contribution to the maintenance of 
peace, justice and progress for all peoples of the world” (emphasis added), that 
“the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered 
as a whole,” and that it was desirable to establish a legal order “which will 
facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the 
seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the 
conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation 
of the marine environment.”10 The negotiators of UNCLOS believed that “the 
achievement of these goals will contribute to the realization of a just and equitable 
international economic order which takes into account the interests and needs of 
mankind as a whole” (emphasis added).11 Further, that the “codification and 
progressive development of the law of the sea achieved in the Convention … will 
                                              
6 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, UNGA Res 217 A, UN Doc. A/RES/3/217A, adopted 10 December 
1948 (hereafter cited as Universal Declaration), preamble. 
7 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, preamble. 
8 Id, art 42.  
9 Id, arts 25-28 & 32 provide for land and resource rights. Article 29 deals specifically with environmental 
protection. 
10 UNCLOS, n. 4 above, preamble. 
11 Id. 
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promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples of the world …” 
(emphasis added).12  
 
The two instruments resulted from prolonged multilateral conference diplomacy 
characterized by difficult negotiation processes, both leading to final voting on 
their adoption despite extensive efforts towards consensus-building. Eventually 
both instruments secured overwhelming international acceptance. Both 
instruments play vital roles in international law by setting out frameworks and 
nourishing the larger legal system with respect to the issues they address. We do 
not assume that being part of the common legal edifice alone is sufficient to 
conclude that there must be a relationship between the two, for after all 
international law addresses a wide range of diverse and not necessarily always 
related subjects.  Rather, we posit that if the two instruments address potentially 
common subject-matter within the purview of each other’s scope, it is worth 
enquiring if there is interaction and what that might be. At times, regimes in 
international law have been developed in silos and giving rise to potential policy 
and normative conflicts.13 Thus it is useful to explore whether the two instruments 
expressly or implicitly anticipate relationships to other instruments and norms of 
international law.14  
Hence our query and consequential consideration of whether UNDRIP could 
supplement or assist the interpretation of the individual and collective obligations 
of State Parties in implementing UNCLOS where ocean space and indigenous 
                                              
12 Id. 
13 One such example is the separate development of the Paris Climate Agreement and World Trade Organization 
Rules, aspects of which potentially conflict. See  J. Bacchus, The Case for a WTO Climate Waiver, CIGI Special 
Report (CIGI, 2017), available online: 
<https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/NEWEST%20Climate%20Waiver%20-
%20Bacchus.pdf>. See also World Economic Forum, From Collision to Vision: Climate Change and World 
Trade, Discussion Paper Circulated by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Trade and Climate Change (November 
2010), available online: <http://www.felixpena.com.ar/contenido/negociaciones/anexos/2010-12-
WEF_ClimateChange_WorldTradeDiscussionPaper_2010.pdf>. 
14 In fact, UNDRIP has been compared to other norms of international law, such as International Investment Law. 
See Christina Binder, “Interactions with International Investment Law” in UNDRIP Commentary n.3 above at 
87-111.  
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rights potentially intertwine in a contemporary setting. We will first examine  the 
legal status of UNDRIP and UNCLOS in international law and then proceed to 
analyse specific provisions that concern potentially related content to explore the 
interface between the two instruments before concluding with an assessment on 
the potential relationship and its consequences. While it would be valuable to go 
into domestic legislation and case law, exploration of domestic practices is 
outside the scope of this analysis. It is hoped that this reflective scholarly enquiry 
generates further discussion on the novel yet essential question on the 
interlinkages in public international law. 
 
 
THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
 
Development of UNDRIP in view of the evolution of indigenous rights 
 
Considering the generally slow pace at which international law evolves, 
indigenous peoples have achieved a great deal in a relatively short period of time. 
The modern international indigenous peoples’ movement did not fully begin until 
the end of the 1970s and the first efforts to advance their rights within the UN 
were undertaken from 1982 onwards under the UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations (WGIP). In 1989, the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) replaced its largely assimilationist 1957 convention with the ILO C-169 - 
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 
169),15 which fleshed out a wide variety of legal rights for indigenous peoples. 
As the UN worked on adopting the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, the Organization of American States (OAS) began drawing up a similar 
                                              
15 ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, adopted 27 June 
1989 (entered into force 5 September 1991), 28 ILM (1989) (hereafter cited as ILO 169 Convention), at  1382.  
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declaration for American indigenous peoples,16 and the Nordic States started to 
work on a Nordic Saami Convention.17 This normative activity manifested itself 
in the work of some UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies, in particular the 
Human Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.18 These 
bodies started to interpret their respective conventions vis-à-vis indigenous 
peoples in line with developments of a distinct body of law for indigenous 
peoples.19 Notably, environmental protection treaties set up exceptions in their 
provisions recognising the right of indigenous communities to act according to 
their cultural traditions.20  
 
The work that eventually became the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) began in 1985 within the WGIP, which consisted 
of five expert members and which from the beginning allowed indigenous 
                                              
16 American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted on 15 June 2016 at the third plenary session 
of the OAS’s General Assembly, available online: <https://www.oas.org/en/sare/documents/DecAmIND.pdf>. 
The declaration was negotiated from 1999 to 2016. 
17 Nordic Saami Convention, adopted 13 January 2017 (not yet in force), available online 
<https://www.sametinget.se/105173>. The draft Convention was submitted to the three governments as early as 
2005, and the finalized text was accepted in June 2017. It is still unclear whether the Saami parliaments and the 
governments will move forward with the convention. 
18 Examples of other conventions that incorporated indigenous peoples’ rights are: Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, adopted 20 November 1989 (entered into force 2 September 1990),  GA res. 44/25, 1577 UNTS 3, 
available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx>, especially art 30; Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopted 20 October 2005 (entered into force 
18 March 2007), 2440 UNTS (hereafter cited as CPPDCE), art 7(1)(a), available online: 
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002253/225383E.pdf>.  
19 “It is through the evolutionary interpretation of human rights treaty provisions, to the extent of expanding their 
inherent individual character to covering ‘collective’ prerogatives, that international human rights bodies have 
universalized indigenous peoples’ rights,” notes the International Law Association, Hague Conference (2010), 
Interim Report on a Commentary on the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereafter cited as ILA 
Interim Report), at 44, available online: <http://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/committees>.  
20 For example, Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, adopted 9 February 1957 
(entered into force 14 October 1957), 314 UNTS 105 (1957), art VII;  Agreement on the Conservation of Polar 
Bears, adopted 15 November 1973 (entered into force 26 May 1976), 13 ILM 13 (1973), art III(1)(d), available 
online: <http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/agreements/agreement1973.html>; Convention on the Conservation of 
Migratory Species of Wild Animals (1979), adopted 23 June 1979 (entered into force 1 November 1983), 1651 
UNTS 217, art III(5)(c), available online: <https://www.cms.int/>; Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted 
5 June 1992 (entered into force 29 December 1993), 1760 UNTS 79 (hereafter, CBD) art 8(j). Aboriginal 
subsistence whaling was exempted from the prohibition on whaling imposed by the International Whaling 
Commission established by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, adopted 2 December 
1946 (entered into force 10 November 1948), 161 UNTS 72, available online: <https://iwc.int/convention>. Also 
see the European Union Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 on Trade in Seal Products, Official Journal of the European Union, L 286 of 31 October 2009.  
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peoples broad access to the process, irrespective of whether they had gained 
indigenous status with ECOSOC.21 For almost a decade, the WGIP devoted a 
large part of its time to drafting the text of what was to become the UN 
Declaration in a process involving representatives of indigenous peoples, 
government delegations and experts on the subject. This was a large area of work, 
since the Declaration aimed to cover all individual and collective rights of 
indigenous peoples in all possible areas of their lives, from their self-
determination to their right to environment, or from their free prior and informed 
consent over the proposed natural resource exploitation to their labour rights. The 
Declaration aims to protect indigenous peoples’ distinct cultures, their ownership 
and use rights to their ancestral lands and waters, the protection of their 
environments and their cultural heritage. In the following, the development of the 
UN Declaration is examined especially in view of its provisions on self-
determination, given that these were a major bone of contention between States 
and indigenous peoples and eventually delayed also the adoption of the UNDRIP.  
 
In 1994, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities (now the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights) adopted the Draft Declaration prepared by the 
WGIP and sent it to its parent body, the Commission on Human Rights (now 
replaced by the Human Rights Council), for consideration.22 The article on self-
determination at this stage drew heavily on Article 1(1) of the common Article to 
                                              
21 In 1982 the Working Group on Indigenous Populations was established as a subsidiary organ to the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (now the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights), endorsed by ECOSOC on 7 May 1982; UN Doc. E/Res/1982/34. It 
is comprised of five members of the Sub-Commission, one representing each of the five geographical regions 
designated by the UN for electoral purposes. As a subsidiary organ of the Sub-Commission, the Working Group 
is located at the lowest level of the hierarchy of UN human rights bodies. Its recommendations have to be 
considered and accepted first by its superior body, the Sub-Commission, then by the Commission on Human 
Rights (now the Human Rights Council) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) before being submitted 
to the General Assembly. 
22 Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, 1994/45, available online: 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.SUB.2.RES.1994.45.En>. 
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the Covenants in stating that “[I]ndigenous peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”23 
 
Another important provision of the 1994 Draft for the future framing of the 
right to self-determination of indigenous peoples was Article 31, which set out a 
right to autonomy: 
 
Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters 
relating to their internal and local affairs, including culture, religion, 
education, information, media, health, housing, employment, social 
welfare, economic activities, land and resources management, environment 
and entry by non-members, as well as ways and means for financing these 
autonomous functions.24 
 
In 1995, the Commission on Human Rights considered the text submitted 
by the Sub-Commission and decided to establish an inter-sessional Working 
Group25 with a mandate to consider the text presented and to draw up a draft 
declaration for the consideration by the Commission and eventual adoption by 
the UN General Assembly as part of the International Decade of the World’s 
Indigenous People (1995-2004), a goal that was never achieved. The inter-
sessional Working Group consisted only of State representatives, although 
indigenous peoples were given access to the process by being accorded the status 
                                              
23 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29/Annex I, 23 August 1993, art 3. 
24 Id, art 31. 
25 Resolution of the Commission on Human Rights 1995/32, 3 March 1995. 
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of observers. In practice, this enabled direct negotiations between indigenous 
peoples and state representatives.26 
 
Even though progress was slow in the Working Group and the goal of having 
the UN General Assembly adopt the UN Declaration by the end of 2004 was 
never achieved, in June 2006 the newly created UN Human Rights Council 
adopted the Declaration (although not without opposition (30 votes in favour, 2 
against, 12 abstentions)),27 recommending that the UN General Assembly adopt 
it. The Declaration had the following formulations of the right to self-
determination, which later proved difficult for States to accept: 
 
Article 3 
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
 
Article 4 
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the 
right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal 
and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous 
functions. 
 
                                              
26 During the negotiations, the UN consolidated its institutional machinery for advancing the rights of indigenous 
peoples and in making sure that these were supervised and implemented. During the beginning of this century, 
the UN established the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, Expert Mechanism on Indigenous Peoples 
and, in particular, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. C. E. Foster, “Articulating Self-Determination in 
the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” European Journal of International Law 12, no. 1 
(2001): 141–57. See also S. Errico, “The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An 
Overview,” Human Rights Law Review 7, no. 4 (2007): 741–755. G. Pentassuglia, “The EU and the Protection of 
Minorities: The Case of Eastern Europe”, European Journal of International Law vol 12 (2001): 141–157. 
27 See the version adopted by the Human Rights Council, (A/HRC/1/L.10, 30 June 2006, 56-72. See the 
explanatory paper by Canada after voting against the Declaration, which also outlines the reasons for abstention 
by other countries, many of them having problems with Article 3 on self-determination. Canada’s Position: United 
Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 29 June 2006), available online: 
<http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/nr/spch/unp/06/ddr_e.html>. 
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Even though the original 1994 Draft and the 2006 Draft adopted by the Human 
Rights Council are identical in framing the right to self-determination of 
indigenous peoples, it is noteworthy that what had been Article 31, dealing with 
autonomy and self-government, had become Article 4. It was now possible to 
read Article 3, on self-determination, and Article 4 – the two key provisions – 
together.28  
 
Even with the relocation of Article 31, the process of adopting the UN 
Declaration came to a halt when a non-action resolution by the Namibian 
Delegation was supported by the majority in the Third Committee of the UN 
General Assembly.29 One clear reason for this was precisely Article 3, which was 
still there stating that indigenous peoples have a right to freely determine their 
political status. It is not difficult to imagine that adopting such a text would have 
been troublesome for anyone in the Third Committee, especially those 
representing the African countries. 30 
                                              
28 It can be argued that art 4 specifies that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is limited to the “right 
to autonomy or self-government”, which is often called the right to internal self-determination, that is, self-
determination within the confines of existing states. This interpretation is made even more pertinent when we 
compare the way the right to autonomy and self-government are worded in arts 31 and 4: the former saw it “as a 
specific form of exercising their right to self-determination”, the latter “in exercising their right to self-
determination”. The first formulation, if read in the context of art 3, seems to indicate that autonomy and self-
government are possible ways to implement indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, whereas the new art 
4 gives more force to the argument that the right to autonomy and self-government embraces the ways in which 
indigenous peoples’ self-determination can be realised. See also ILA Interim Report, n. 16 above, at 11, where it 
states that the object and purpose of autonomy or self-government under art 4 is to enable indigenous peoples to 
“freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”, i.e., 
the right to self-determination as provided for by art 3.  
29 See Third Committee Approves Draft Resolution on Right to Development, UN General Assembly (Third 
Committee) Press Release (28 November 2006), available online: 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gashc3878.doc.htm>. As stated in the press release: “[B]ut an 
initiative led by Namibia, co-sponsored by a number of African countries, resulted in the draft being amended.  In 
its new form, the draft would have the Assembly decide ‘to defer consideration and action on the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to allow time for further consultations thereon’ … The 
amendments were adopted by a vote of 82 in favour to 67 against, with 25 abstentions (annex II) … Prior to the 
vote, the representative of Peru -– recalling that it had taken 24 years for the Declaration to be hammered out -- 
said the original draft had been revised to address the concerns of many delegations, particularly regarding the 
principle of self-determination of peoples and respect for national sovereignty… However, his counterpart from 
Namibia, explaining the proposed amendments, said that some provisions ran counter to the national constitutions 
of a number of African countries and that the Declaration was of such critical importance that it was only ‘fair 
and reasonable’ to defer its adoption by the Assembly to allow for more consultations”.  
30 Other delegations also expressed their reservations. For instance Argentina and the Philippines insisted that the 
right to self-determination should be interpreted so as to be reconciled with territorial integrity, national unity or 
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The matter came up for a final decision in the 61st session of the General 
Assembly in September 2007 where the Declaration was adopted, with 143 States 
voting in favour, four against (New Zealand, Australia, the USA and Canada) and 
11 abstaining (including Russia).31 There were some important changes in the 
Declaration as compared to the version adopted by the Human Rights Council, 
most importantly with regard to the right to self-determination of indigenous 
peoples. The version adopted by the Human Rights Council left the door open for 
indigenous peoples to claim full-blown self-determination for the simple reason 
that Article 3 was still there, entitling them in principle to fully determine their 
political status. This was the crux of the matter, even though a good argument can 
be made that Articles 3 and 4 should have been interpreted together to mean that 
indigenous peoples were entitled to internal self-determination only, although 
Article 3 still left the door open for indigenous peoples to claim full self-
determination. In order to make sure that there was no possibility to read too much 
into Article 3, the version ultimately adopted by the UN General Assembly made 
a crucial change in Article 46(1), which in the version adopted by the Human 
Rights Council read that “[N]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as 
implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity 
or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.” This was 
changed to make sure that indigenous peoples’ self-determination could mean at 
most internal self-determination: 
 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary 
to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging 
                                              
organizational structure of each State. See UN GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th Plenary Meeting, UN Doc. A/61/PV.107, 
13 September 2007, para 19 and 108th Plenary Meeting, UN Doc. A/61/PV.108, 13 September 2007, para 5. Also 
see the ILA Interim Report, n. 19 above, at 9-10.  
31 For a general overview, see the information available online: <http://www.iwgia.org/sw248.asp>. 
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any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.32 
 
UNDRIP is clearly a milestone development in the evolution of indigenous 
rights in international law.33 The ILO 169 Convention has not received many 
ratifications (22 so far) so the 147 States that are now in favour of implementing 
the UNDRIP and its 46 provisions certainly constitute a backbone for indigenous 
rights. It needs to be remembered that these States have also committed to the 
preamble of the Declaration, which includes:   
 
Encouraging States to comply with and effectively implement all their 
obligations as they apply to indigenous peoples under international 
instruments, in particular those related to human rights, in consultation and 
cooperation with the peoples concerned,  
 
Emphasizing that the United Nations has an important and continuing role 
to play in promoting and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples.34 
 
It is also important to keep in mind that States have affirmed in Article 43 that 
“[T]he rights recognized herein constitute the minimum standards for the 
survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world”.35 
 
                                              
32 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, art 46 (1).  
33“Before UNDRIP, a number of issues afflicting indigenous peoples had been addressed through broad based 
universal human rights regimes … and then ILO Convention No. 169 specifically codified indigenous peoples’ 
rights, yet a global comprehensive effort was missing.” S. Wiessner, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, Introductory Note,” United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law Historical 
Archives (2009), available online: <http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_61- /ga_61-295.html 295AD>. 
34 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, preamble. 
35 Wiessner quotes J. Anaya: “UNDRIP constitutes an authoritative common understanding, at the global level, 
of the minimum content of the rights of indigenous peoples, upon a foundation of various sources of international 
human rights law … The principles and rights affirmed in the Declaration constitute or add to the normative 
frameworks for the activities of United Nations human rights institutions, mechanisms and specialized agencies 
as they relate to indigenous peoples.” Wiessner, n. 33 above. 
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Legal status of UNDRIP 
 
The UNDRIP is an UNGA resolution, and, as such, it is not legally binding. Even 
if some declarations, adopted as UNGA resolutions, such as the UN Declaration 
of Human Rights, are highly authoritative, as UNGA resolutions they remain 
legally non-binding. And yet, although non-mandatory as such, the UNDRIP may 
have the effect of codifying at least some customary international law rights of 
indigenous peoples.36  
  
On 13 September 2007 the final version of UNDRIP was adopted by a clear 
vote of 143 in favour and four States against. The United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand voted against it, while 11 – Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russia, Samoa and 
Ukraine – abstained from voting. Yet, after the vote, all of the four States that 
voted against the UNDRIP eventually endorsed it, even if some with reservations.  
 
The International Law Association (ILA), a prominent non-governmental 
organization of international lawyers, examined the status of UNDRIP in 
customary international law.37 The interim report concluded that perhaps the 
whole of UNDRIP could be seen to codify customary international law, simply 
                                              
36 The ILA notes: “A general opinio juris and consuetudo exists within the international community according to 
which certain basic prerogatives that are essential in order to safeguard the identity and basic rights of indigenous 
peoples are today crystallized in the realm of customary international law.” ILA Interim Report, n.19 above, at 
43-44. For scholarly interpretations, see S. James Anaya and Luis Rodríguez-Piñero, “The Making of the 
UNDRIP”, in UNDRIP Commentary n 3. above at 62.; Wiessner, n. 33 above; D. Sambo Dorough, “The Rights, 
Interests and Role of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants,” in eds. R. Beckman et al., Governance of Arctic 
Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and User States (Brill Nijhoff, 2017), at 78; S. Wiessner 
and S. J. Anaya, “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards Re-Empowerment” (2007), 
available online: <https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-of-indigenous-2/>; S.  
Wiessner, “Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples:  A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis,” 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 12 (1999): 57;  M. Davis, “To Bind or Not Bind: The United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Five Years On,” Australian International Law Journal 19 (2012): 40-44. 0 
37 In January 2011 the position supported by the Committee in its Interim Report - ILA Interim Report n.19 above 
was favourably referred to by an ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, in the Grande River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et 
al. v United States of America, 12 January 2011, available online: 
<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156820.pdf>. See also International Law Association, Sofia 
Conference (2012), Final Report, available online: <http://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/committees>. 
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because many human rights treaty monitoring bodies have started to use UNDRIP 
as a guide to interpret their respective human rights instruments that are legally 
binding on most States of the world.38 As provided in the interim report: 
 
Having ascertained the foregoing, it is opportune to make clear that it is not 
important to investigate whether the relevant rules of customary 
international law actually correspond, in their precise content, to the 
provision of UNDRIP in their actual formulation. By its own nature a 
declaration of principles, even when its content partially reproduces 
general international law, has in fact also a propulsive force, aimed at 
favouring further evolution of its subject matter for the future. What is 
really significant for the present enquiry is that the adoption of UNDRIP, 
after more than twenty years of negotiations, confirms that the international 
community has come to a consensus that indigenous peoples are a concern 
of international law, which translates into the existence of customary rules 
of binding force for all States irrespective of whether or not they have 
ratified the relevant treaties (which, on their part, taken together bind 
virtually all countries in the world). Therefore, it is today indisputable that 
‘customary norms concerning indigenous peoples and their pull toward 
compliance’ are actually a reality in the context of the contemporary 
international legal order.39 
 
The final report of the Committee (as well as Resolution No. 5/2012) notes that 
some of the provisions of the UNDRIP do evince customary international law. In 
its conclusions and recommendations, at paragraph 2, the final report (and the 
resolution) provide: 
 
                                              
38 Id., ILA Interim Report at 51. 
39 Id. 
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The 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) as a whole cannot yet be considered as a statement of existing 
customary international law. It, however, includes key provisions which 
correspond to existing State obligations under customary international 
law.40 
 
 
Provisions recognising clear rights of indigenous peoples under customary 
international law are listed below: 
 
The right of indigenous peoples to self-determination (paragraph 4); right 
to autonomy and self-government which translates into a number of 
prerogatives including participatory and consultation rights (paragraph 5); 
cultural rights and identity (paragraph 6); right to lands, territories and 
resources (paragraph 7); treaty rights (paragraph 9); reparation, redress and 
remedies (paragraph 10).41  
 
With respect to these rights, the ILA had stated earlier in its interim report: 
 
The rights are all strictly interrelated with each other in light of the holistic 
vision of life of indigenous peoples and consequently the relevant practice 
supporting the existence of customary law concerning each of the above 
                                              
40 International Law Association, Sofia Conference (2012), Final Report, at 29, available online: <http://www.ila-
hq.org/index.php/committees>. See also Resolution No. 5/2012 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. On the status 
of ILA Resolutions, Wiessner notes: “Generally, resolutions of the International Law Association, just as those of 
the International Law Commission, have been recognized as evidence of international law. The Third Restatement 
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States affirms this characterization. He also quotes Graf Vitzthum: global 
resolutions of a body as qualified and diverse as the International Law Association are stating a rare consensus 
amongst, at times, radically different cultures and value traditions, and thus should be especially appreciated and 
valued.” See Siegfried Wiessner, “Culture and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in The Cultural Dimension of 
Human Rights, ed. Ana Vrdoljak (Oxford University Press, 2013) at 154-155; The American Law Institute, Third 
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), § 103 Reporters’ Notes No. 1. 
41 Id, ILA Sofia Conference (2012) Final Report and Resolution No.5/2012.  
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rights usually also serves the purpose of backing the assumption that the 
same status has been attained by any or all of the others.42 
 
Also, the Report observes that several rights that are not yet custom are emerging 
as customary norms.43 Irrespective of their legal status, most States with 
indigenous peoples in their territories have committed politically to realize their 
rights via the UNDRIP. 
 
 
 
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
Development of the international law of the sea 
 
UNCLOS44 has been characterized as “a comprehensive constitution for the 
oceans which will stand the test of time” and which “represents a monumental 
achievement of the international community, second only to the charter of the 
United Nations.”45 These are not mere metaphors pushing towards hyperbole. 
UNCLOS has 168 State parties, although the US is still not a party. Importantly, 
the US has adopted the view that most of the substantive provisions of the 
Convention reflect customary international law.46 
 
UNCLOS is one of the largest multilateral conventions in international law. 
Coastal States enjoy sovereignty over their internal waters and in the territorial 
                                              
42 ILA Interim Report, n. 19 above.  
43 Id. Paragraph 3 of the Resolution. 
44 UNCLOS, n. 4 above.  
45 “A Constitution for the Oceans,” Remarks by T. B. Koh, President of the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, in The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, 
1983), at xxxiii. 
46 J. A. Roach, “Today’s Customary International Law of the Sea”, Ocean Development and International Law 
45(3) (2014): 239. 
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sea and archipelagic waters, albeit with some constraints to respect international 
community rights, primarily navigational. The EEZ and continental shelf include 
sovereign resource rights and together with the contiguous zone also functional 
jurisdiction, that is specific legislative and enforcement jurisdictional powers. 
The regime for the high seas and the related freedoms is set out and is followed 
by regimes for particular geographical situations (islands, enclosed and semi-
enclosed seas, access and transit rights for land-locked States), and the regime for 
the international seabed area and the new institutional and regulatory framework 
established for its administration. The convention also provides regimes for the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment (which is designed to 
operate in coordination with other environmental instruments), marine scientific 
research and marine technology development and transfer. Navigation rights are 
arguably the international community rights that have received the strongest 
possible level of protection in all ocean spaces under national jurisdiction and on 
the high seas. Other international community rights, such as fishing, laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines and marine scientific research are also protected. 
Finally, UNCLOS sets out a smörgåsbord of direct and third party facilitated 
dispute settlement procedures open to State Parties while also indicating what 
issues are subject to compulsory procedures.  
 
The status of UNCLOS 
 
When considered against the long history of the international law of the sea since 
the 18th century and the extensive efforts at codification and progressive 
development in the 20th century, there is no doubt that UNCLOS enjoys high 
stature and status in international law. It is the result of a long historical timeline, 
trial and error, and adaptive learning. It was the outcome of an intense deliberative 
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process and with the clear intention to address all issues relating to the law of the 
sea, which are considered interrelated and need to be considered as a whole.47  
 
Accordingly, UNCLOS is not to be tampered with lightly and indeed the 
instrument’s own amendment procedures have not yet been used. However, it is 
not a static and closed instrument either. There have been instances where aspects 
of the Convention did not sufficiently or satisfactorily meet some contemporary 
or emergent issues, and accordingly formal initiatives were launched to explore 
possible change. These tended to be guided by compelling necessity and involved 
prolonged preparation and negotiation before adoption of a new instrument 
having the effect of supplementing, if not even amending the Convention. Guided 
by this spirit, the approach of international courts and tribunals called upon to 
interpret provisions of UNCLOS has largely been deferential and circumspect, 
while at the same time exploring interpretations and relationships to other 
instruments to assist resolution.48 
 
UNCLOS anticipates a relationship to a broad range of international 
agreements by referring to other instruments using terminology as diverse as 
conventions,49 special conventions,50 treaty or treaties,51 agreements,52 special 
agreements53 and arrangements or cooperative arrangements.54  This diverse 
terminology was intended to capture a broad range of instruments and structures 
of international cooperation and not only to treaties as generally understood in 
                                              
47  UNCLOS, n. 4 above, preamble. 
48 Tullio Treves, Procedural History of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 
UN Audiovisual Library, available online at: <http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/uncls/uncls.html>. 
49 For example, UNCLOS, n. 4, arts 35(c), 108(1), 237(1), and Annex VI art 22. 
50 Id, art 237(2). 
51 For example, id, arts 92(1), 110(1), 116(a), 146 and Annex VI art 22. 
52 For example, id, arts 62(2), 151(1)(a), 151(1)(b), 151(1)(c), 151(3), 237(1), 269(b), 311(2), 311(3), 311(4), 
311(5), and Annex VI art 21. 
53 Id, art 126. 
54 For example, id, arts 62(2), 62(4)(i), 66(5), 69(3), 69(5), 70(4), 70(6), 74(3), 83(3), 98(2), 151(1)(a), 151(1)(b), 
151(1)(c), 151(3), 211(3) and 298(1)(a)(iii). 
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international law.55 Also, several provisions of UNCLOS anticipate a relationship 
with other rules of international law,56 general international law57 and customary 
law.58 
 
There are very few instances where UNCLOS expressly provides that its 
provisions do not apply when there is another treaty regime in place. The regime 
for straits used for international navigation is a case in point and its provisions do 
not affect “the legal regime in straits in which passage is regulated in whole or in 
part by long-standing international conventions in force specifically relating to 
such straits.”59 There is further recognition that other rules of international law 
may apply in addition to the Convention.60 Elsewhere with respect to its 
relationship to other agreements, the UNCLOS provides that its provision in this 
regard “does not affect international agreements expressly permitted or preserved 
by other articles of this Convention.”61 
 
That UNCLOS addresses all issues relating to the law of the sea does not 
necessarily mean that the Convention applies exclusively, and indeed there may 
be instances where other instruments also apply. For example, with respect to the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment, Article 237 provides that 
 
The provisions of this Part are without prejudice to the specific obligations 
assumed by States under special conventions and agreements concluded 
previously which relate to the protection and preservation of the marine 
                                              
55 Treaty is defined as “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted 23 May 
1969 (entered into force 27 January 1980), 1155 UNTS 331, art 2(1)(a). 
56 For example UNCLOS, n. 4 above, arts 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31, 58(2), 58(3), 87(1), 293(1), and 297(1)(b). 
57 Id, preamble.  
58 Id, art 221(1). 
59 Id, art 35(c). 
60 For example art 34(2), id, provides that “[T]he sovereignty or jurisdiction of the States bordering the straits is 
exercised subject to this Part and to other rules of international law.” 
61 Id, art 311(5). 
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environment and to agreements which may be concluded in furtherance of 
the general principles set forth in this Convention.62 
 
In this case, however, the superiority of UNCLOS over these environmental 
agreements is clear. There is an accompanying duty for States to carry out their 
duties under their agreement in a manner consistent with UNCLOS.63 In a similar 
vein but with respect to general agreements, Article 311(2) provides that  
 
This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties 
which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention and 
which do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or 
the performance of their obligations under this Convention. 
 
The requirement of compatibility effectively establishes hierarchy of UNCLOS 
over other agreements.64 There are also several provisions throughout UNCLOS 
which recognize the relevance or application of other rules of international law in 
so far as they are not incompatible with specific provisions of the Convention.65 
 
Accordingly, UNCLOS acknowledges the existence of instruments that are 
complementary to it. A recent arbitral award considered this point with respect to 
Article 192 of UNCLOS, which provides that obligations in Part XII apply to all 
marine areas, and that there is a corpus of international environmental law that 
informs the provision.66 The tribunal held that Article 192 created “the positive 
obligation to take active measures to protect and preserve the marine 
environment, and by logical implication, entails the negative obligation not to 
                                              
62 Id, art 237(1). 
63 Id, art 237(2). 
64 In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines v People’s Republic of China), 
PCA Case Nº 2013-19, Award (12 July 2016) hereafter cited as Philippines v China). 
65 For example UNCLOS, n. 4 above, arts 58(3), 293(1) and 297(1)(b), and Annex III art 21. 
66 Philippines v China, n. 64 above, para 940. 
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degrade the marine environment,”67 and that the Convention on the International 
Trade in Endangered Species was an instrument that provided pertinent 
obligations.68 
 
A related issue is the relationship between UNCLOS and general 
international law. Despite the desire to settle all issues relating to the law of the 
sea, by its own admission UNCLOS did not manage to fully accomplish this task. 
This is underscored by the preamble which provides “that matters not regulated 
by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general 
international law.”69 The recent Philippines v China arbitral tribunal addressed 
the issue of historic fishing rights in foreign EEZs and concluded that the 
customary law on this subject was superseded by UNCLOS and that therefore 
such claims were not compatible with the Convention. In its ratio, the tribunal 
understood the scope of Article 311(2) to include general international law.70 
 
 Finally, UNCLOS State Parties may modify or suspend the application of 
specific provisions with respect to their relationship where this does not affect the 
Convention’s object and purpose or basic principles and the ability of other State 
Parties to enjoy their rights or perform their obligations.71 In such cases there is a 
duty to notify other States.72 
 
                                              
67 Id, para 941. 
68 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, adopted 3 March 1973 
(entered into force 1 July 1975), 993 UNTS 243 (hereafter cited as CITES). The Tribunal stated, “CITES forms 
part of the general corpus of international law that informs the content of Article 192 and 194(5) of UNCLOS. 
The conservation of the living resources of the sea is an element in the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, and the general obligation to ‘protect and preserve the marine environment’ in Article 192 includes 
a due diligence obligation to prevent the harvesting of species that are recognised internationally as being at risk 
of extinction and requiring international protection.” For identifying the species at risk, the Tribunal noted 
appendices I (species threatened with extinction and subject to the strictest level of international controls on trade) 
and II (species which may become threatened with extinction) of CITES. Philippines v China, n. 64 above, at 
paras 956-957. 
69 UNCLOS, n. 4 above, preamble. 
70 Philippines v China, n. 64 above, para 235. 
71 UNCLOS, n. 4 above, art 311(3). 
72 Id, art 311(4). 
22 
 
 
EXPLORING THE INTERFACE BETWEEN UNDRIP AND UNCLOS 
 
Having considered the historical context and legal status of UNDRIP and 
UNCLOS, we now explore the potential interface between the two. This analysis 
is undertaken in two steps, first to consider what might be the legal pathway(s) 
for UNDRIP (and the customary law it might incorporate) into the law of the sea, 
second what specific issues could potentially bring the two instruments into a 
relationship. We do not undertake an exhaustive examination to ascertain what 
provisions of UNDRIP have achieved customary law status, but rather rely on the 
observations made by the ILA and hypothesize what provisions in UNDRIP could 
potentially interface with provisions in UNCLOS.73 
 
Legal pathways 
 
We argue that there are two potential legal pathways for UNDRIP to provide a 
supportive role for the law of the sea. A first argument is based on the continuing 
role of general international law with respect to aspects of the law of the sea that 
are not addressed by UNCLOS. As observed earlier, UNDRIP may reflect 
customary international law and if any of its provisions address a law of the sea 
matter not addressed by UNCLOS, it is arguable that the provisions concerned, 
qua custom, would govern the relations of States with respect to that matter. 
Naturally, one would need to ask the further question as to the likelihood that 
there are UNDRIP provisions that might qualify as law of the sea matters and 
which are not already addressed by UNCLOS. 
 
                                              
73 The observations made by the ILA in the Interim Report 2010, Final Conference  Report 2012, Resolution 
No. 5/2012, n.19 and 40 above. 
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The second argument is based on the interpretation of Article 192 provided 
by Philippines v China, where the tribunal held: 
 
Article 192 of the Convention provides that “States have the obligation to 
protect and preserve the marine environment.” Although phrased in general 
terms, the Tribunal considers it well established that Article 192 does 
impose a duty on States Parties, the content of which is informed by the 
other provisions of Part XII and other applicable rules of international law. 
This “general obligation” extends both to “protection” of the marine 
environment from future damage and “preservation” in the sense of 
maintaining or improving its present condition. Article 192 thus entails the 
positive obligation to take active measures to protect and preserve the 
marine environment, and by logical implication, entails the negative 
obligation not to degrade the marine environment. The corpus of 
international law relating to the environment, which informs the content of 
the general obligation in Article 192, requires that States “ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond national control.”74 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 (CBD)75 and the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1973 
(CITES)76 were considered as informing Article 192, as well as 194. With 
reference to CITES, the tribunal held that this instrument “is the subject of nearly 
universal adherence, including by the Philippines and China, and in the Tribunal’s 
view forms part of the general corpus of international law that informs the content 
of Article 192 and 194(5) of the Convention.”77 
                                              
74 Philippines v China, n. 64 above, at para 941. 
75 CBD, n. 20 above. 
76 CITES, n. 68 above. 
77 Philippines v China, n. 64 above, at para 956. 
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The ‘corpus’ interpretation raises the interesting question as to what extent, 
if at all, the ‘environmental’ provisions of UNDRIP and the customary law they 
may reflect should be considered part of the corpus of law that informs Article 
192. There is growing literature to support the contention that international 
human rights law contributes to the protection of the environment.78 The 
argument could be extended to other parts of UNCLOS, such as Part III on marine 
scientific research, where provisions of UNDRIP and other international 
agreements, for example the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization (ABS) to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2014,79 which 
arguably have provisions that could inform the regime of consent in marine 
scientific research (MSR) under UNCLOS, as will be discussed below.  
 
Specific issues 
 
We now proceed to identify specific issues for a more focused exploration of the 
potential interface between the two instruments.  
 
                                              
78 For example, Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development specifically notes the role 
of indigenous peoples: “[I]ndigenous people and their communities… have a vital role in environmental 
management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognise and 
duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in the achievement of 
sustainable development.” See also Principles 10, 13, 17, and 23 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, adopted 13 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 (1992). See also A. Boyle, 
“Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next,” European Journal of International Law 23, no. 3 (2012): 
613–42; P. Sands, “Human Rights and the Environment,” Proceedings of a Geneva Environment Network 
roundtable, 2004; J. Harrington, “Climate Change, Human Rights, and the Right to Be Cold,” Fordham 
Environmental Law Review 18, no. 3 (2007) and the Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights 
Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United 
States (Submitted by Sheila Watt-Cloutier, with the support of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, on behalf of All 
Inuit of the Arctic Regions of the United States and Canada) (7 December 2005), available online: 
<http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/uploads/3/0/5/4/30542564/finalpetitionsummary.pdf>.  
79 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted 29 October 2010 (entered into force 12 
October 2014), Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (29 October 2010), art 8.b, available online: 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/UNEP_CBD_COP_DEC_X_1-E.pdf>. 
25 
 
Territorial, economic and resource issues 
 
UNDRIP sets out a series of territorial and resource use rights of indigenous 
peoples that potentially apply to ocean space. These include the right to engage 
freely in traditional and other economic activities80 and to “maintain and 
strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or 
otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other 
resources ...”.81 Waters and coastal seas presumptively include ice-covered 
marine areas.82 One of the most powerful rights is to “the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or 
acquired,”83 which is accompanied by the further “right to own, use, develop and 
control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of 
traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those 
which they have otherwise acquired.”84 The ILA notes in its Resolution 
No.5/2012 that States must protect the rights of indigenous peoples to their 
traditional lands, territories and resources. 85 
 
                                              
80 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, art 20. Article 20 protects the traditional activities or means of subsistence of indigenous 
peoples. It falls within the right to autonomy or self-government.  See ILA Interim Report, n. 19 above, 14-15; 
Camilo Perez-Bustillo and Jessie Hohmann, “Indigenous Rights to Development, Socio-Economic Rights, and 
Rights for Groups with Vulnerabilities” in UNDRIP Commentary n.3 above at 482- 536. The ILA recognises 
indigenous peoples’ rights to autonomy or self-government as forming part of customary international law. See 
Resolution 5/2012 n.40 above, para 5. 
81 Id.,UNDRIP, art 25. For more elaboration on “spiritual relationship” see Claire Charters, “Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights to Lands, Territories and Resources in the UNDRIP” in UNDRIP Commentary id. at 409-410.The ILO 
169 Convention has a similar provision but does not expressly include waters and territorial seas. It used the terms 
“collective aspects” and “total environment”. ILO 169 Convention, n. 15 above, art 13(1).  
82 The 2013 Alta Outcome Document of the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples contains specific references 
to ice, along with oceans and waters. For instance, its preamble notes, “[W]e Indigenous Peoples, have the right 
of self-determination and permanent sovereignty over our lands, territories, resources, air, ice, oceans and waters, 
mountains and forests” (emphasis added) and the reference is used throughout the document. Available online: 
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/wc/AdoptedAlta_outcomedoc_EN.pdf>. See B. Baker, 
“Interlinkages in International Law: The Convention on Biological Diversity as a Model for Linking Territory, 
Environment, and Indigenous Rights in the Marine Arctic,” in Rebecca Pincus and Saleem H. Ali (eds), 
Diplomacy on Ice: Energy and the Environment in the Arctic and Antarctic (Yale University Press, 2015), 41, 
notes 83-84. 
83 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, art 26(1).  
84 Id, art 26(2).  
85 Resolution No. 5/2012, n.40 above. 
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ILO 169 contained similar provisions concerning rights to lands and resources.86 
In addition, States have substantive and procedural duties to provide legal 
protection to the lands, territories and resources while also being respectful of the 
laws, customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples 
concerned.87  These rights extend further to include determination and 
development of priorities and strategies for the lands, territories and resource 
development or use.88 In this respect, States planning projects that impact on these 
rights have a procedural duty:  
 
to consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain 
their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting 
their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with 
the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other 
resources.89  
 
                                              
86 ILO 169 Convention, n. 15 above, arts 14 and 15. The ILA notes that “[A]rticle 26(2) is confirmed in and 
reflects a vast range of developed jurisprudence, including that of the Inter-American Commission and IACHR, 
the ACHPR, the UN Human Rights Council, the HRC, the CERD, UN experts, UN Special Rapporteurs on 
indigenous peoples’ related issues, ILO adjudicatory bodies and domestic law. As such, the right can be reasonably 
considered as being part of customary international law as also evidenced by extensive state practice as well as 
opinio juris, especially in Latin America and the former Commonwealth colonies.” See ILA Interim Report, n. 19 
above, at 22-23, notes 122-129. See especially the Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v 
Nicaragua, Judgment (31August 31 2001), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79 (2001); Mabo v Queensland (No 
2) (“Mabo Case”) [1992] HCA 23, (1992) 175 CLR 1 (3 June 1992); The Wik Peoples v The State of Queensland 
& Ors; The Thayorre People v The State of Queensland & Ors ('Wik’), HCA 40. 
87 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, arts 26(3) and 27. The ILA states that the state practice accompanying art 26(2) also 
supports the Article 26(3) State obligations. ILA Interim Report, n. 19 above. 
88 Id, art 32(1). “This alongwith art 32(2) is pivotal to enabling Indigenous peoples to set and pursue their own 
development path.” See Claire Charters n. above at 447.  
89 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, art 32(2). The ILA notes that this provision was contentious during the negotiations as it 
brings to fore some of the most pressing concerns for indigenous peoples, such as competing States’ and 
indigenous peoples’ claims to natural resources.  As such, States’ consultation obligation was inserted and this 
implies consultation should be undertaken with the objective of obtaining indigenous peoples’ free, prior and 
informed consent, and in cases of large scale development projects with the potential to have a major impact on 
indigenous peoples’ territory, consent is necessary. See ILA Interim Report, n. 19 above, at 24-35; James Anaya, 
“Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in relation to Decisions about Natural Resource Extraction: The More 
Fundamental Issue of What Rights Indigenous Peoples Have in Lands and Resources” Arizona Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 22, no.1 (2011):7-17.This is also a key provision to address especially those 
cases where Indigenous customary law and national legislation differ as to the regime of these resources. Id, Claire 
Charters at 431.   
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This provision signifies substantial procedural duties. 
 
While ‘waters’ and ‘coastal seas’ appear to be associated with a different 
right from the ownership right, the reference to territories might, in a law of the 
sea context, potentially include internal and territorial waters.90 Per se, this does 
not appear to have any consequence for pertinent UNCLOS rules concerning the 
delineation of baselines and bay closing lines and the regime of the territorial sea. 
The UNDRIP rights described in this section essentially are domestic, that is 
falling under the framework of coastal State jurisdiction, and do not appear to 
produce external consequences.91 The extent to which a coastal State recognizes 
and implements domestic indigenous rights in this respect is not governed by 
UNCLOS.  
 
A separate question is whether indigenous resource rights could potentially 
be transboundary. There are precedents for the protection of traditional 
transboundary fishing rights.92 Although UNCLOS makes no express reference 
to indigenous rights, in a provision on archipelagic waters, which are subject to 
the sovereignty of the archipelagic State, it establishes a duty on that State to 
                                              
90 Claire Charters notes, “negotiators drafting the UNDRIP struggled to express semantically the relationships that 
Indigenous peoples have with their lands, territories and resources because Indigenous peoples often conceive of 
that relationship differently from non-Indigenous peoples.” Id, Claire Charters at 406. Dalee Sambo Dorough 
notes in the context of the Inuit, “[F]or the Inuit, a critical element is the need to recognise the profound 
relationship that they have with the Arctic Ocean coastal areas and their respective lands, territories and resources. 
In this context, the term ‘territories’ should be regarded as comprehensive and inclusive of the coastal land areas, 
shore fast sea ice, offshore areas of the ocean itself, including the seabed, which have been traditionally used for 
millennia as the source of sustenance in the way of whales, seals, walrus, migratory birds and other marine life.” 
Sambo Dorough, n. 36 above, at 80.  
91  Id., Sambo Dorough. As an example, the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement in Canada affirms Inuit rights 
to the 12 nautical mile territorial sea, consistent with UNCLOS.  
92 See Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen 
(Maritime Delimitation), XXII Reports of International Arbitral Awards 355–410 (Permanent Court of Arbitration 
1999). The award recognized and protected traditional transboundary fishing rights of fishers from both sides. See 
also B. H. Oxman and W. M. Reisman, “Maritime Delimitation between Opposite States - Traditional ‘Artisanal’ 
Fishing Regimes - Transboundary Nonliving Resources - Interpretation of Prior Award - Straight Baselines - 
Effect of Coastal and Midsea Islands,” American Journal of International Law 94 (2000): 721–22. 
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recognize traditional fishing rights, but without prejudice to its sovereignty.93 The 
term traditional could be interpreted to include traditional indigenous use. The 
Convention provides a framework for the definition and regulation of such 
rights.94 This duty does not have a parallel in the territorial sea. There is no such 
reference to traditional fishing rights in the EEZ, although with respect to the 
coastal State’s allocation of the surplus in the total allowable catch to other States, 
the Convention provides for the coastal State to take into account all relevant 
factors, “inter alia … the requirements of developing States in the subregion or 
region in harvesting part of the surplus and the need to minimize economic 
dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone …”.95 It 
stands to logic and reason that ‘inter alia’ be interpreted to include traditional 
indigenous fishing and habitual fishing to also include indigenous fishing that is 
long-established in the area. What is unclear is whether the coastal State, as a 
result of UNDRIP and the customary law it reflects, ought to provide preferential 
access to the surplus to indigenous fishers from a neighbouring State who have 
habitually fished in the area. In these cases, the coastal State retains the right to 
regulate fishing by foreign nationals.96 The access to the surplus is a privilege, 
not a right. The Philippines v China arbitration considered the issue of historic 
fishing rights (although not specifically in the context of traditional indigenous 
fishing) in foreign EEZs and concluded that such rights were effectively 
extinguished by the regime of the EEZ.97   
                                              
93 UNCLOS, n. 4 above, art 51(1). For a commentary on this provision, see S. N. Nandan and S. Rosenne (vol 
eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary vol II (Martinus Nijhoff, 2002), 447 
et seq. 
94 “The terms and conditions for the exercise of such rights and activities, including the nature the extent and the 
areas to which they apply, shall, at the request of any of the States concerned, be regulated by bilateral agreements 
between them. Such rights shall not be transferred to or shared with third States or their nationals.” UNCLOS, n. 
4, art 51(1). 
95 Id, art 62(3). See Philippines v China, n. 64 above, para 242. 
96 Id, art 62(4). 
97 “The Tribunal considers the text and context of the Convention to be clear in superseding any historic rights 
that a State may once have had in the areas that now form part of the exclusive economic zone and continental 
shelf of another State.” Philippines v China, n. 64 above, para 247. The tribunal also noted Qatar v Bahrain on 
historic pearl fishing where the International Court of Justice held that it “seems in any event never to have led to 
the recognition of an exclusive quasi-territorial right to the fishing grounds themselves or to the superjacent 
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It is possible that indigenous rights under other instruments could potentially 
have a more direct relationship to UNCLOS provisions. These are outside the 
remit of this article and we refer to them only briefly. For example, under the 
CBD framework for in situ conservation,98 State Parties have a duty to respect, 
preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous 
peoples and to encourage and develop methods of cooperation that include 
indigenous and traditional technologies in pursuance of the objectives of the 
CBD.99  
 
Mobility and communication issues 
 
UNCLOS does not directly address human mobility and communication issues, 
other than a brief reference to the jurisdiction for this purpose in the contiguous 
zone and navigation rights.100 In recent years there has been a discernible growth 
of concern over immigrants and refugees using sea routes,101 but this is not a 
concern in this article. Rather, an interesting issue which is not addressed by 
UNCLOS is the transboundary movement of people for kinship and traditional 
resource use reasons that are otherwise affected by maritime boundaries. The 
Convention’s provisions on maritime boundary delimitation are couched in very 
general and issue-neutral terms, thus of no direct help on this matter. There are 
situations where indigenous people move across a maritime boundary for 
subsistence, spiritual, kinship and other communication purposes, as in the case 
of the transboundary North Water Polynya (Pikialasorsuaq) where the ice bridge 
                                              
waters.” Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2001, 40, para 236. 
98 CBD, n. 20 above, art 8(j). 
99 Ibid, art 18(4). 
100 UNCLOS, art 33(1). 
101 See “In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants,” Report of the Secretary 
General (UN Doc. A/70/59, April 21, 2016, UN General Assembly, 70th session), also published in International 
Journal of Refugee Law vol. 28 (2016): 500-530. See Francesco Munari, “Migrations by Sea in the Mediterranean: 
An Improvement of EU Law is Urgently Needed,” Ocean Yearbook 32: 118-158.   
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across the maritime boundary between Greenland and Ellesmere Island (Canada) 
is very important for the Inuit of Canada and Greenland (Kalaallit Nunaat) to 
maintain regular contact.102 
 
International human rights instruments have addressed the issue of mobility 
in different ways. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights stated the 
principle as the right of everyone to “freedom of movement and residence within 
the borders of each State” and “the right to leave any country, including his own, 
and to return to his country.”103 The ILO 169 Convention addressed mobility and 
communication and cooperation across borders in generic terms and provided that 
“Governments shall take appropriate measures, including by means of 
international agreements, to facilitate contacts and co-operation between 
indigenous and tribal peoples across borders, including activities in the economic, 
social, cultural, spiritual and environmental fields.”104 UNDRIP is more on point 
with respect to indigenous peoples “divided by international borders” who have 
“the right to maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including 
activities for spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their 
own members as well as other peoples across borders.”105 States have a 
                                              
102 See People of the Ice Bridge: The Future of Pikialasorsuaq, Report of the Pikialasorsuaq Commission, available 
online: <http://pikialasorsuaq.org/en/Resources/Reports>. See in particular Recommendation 3 on freedom to 
travel. The Commission found examples of bilateral agreements that support the recommendation to ease travel 
restrictions, such as: Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between His Britannick Majesty and the United 
States of America, London, 19 November 1794 (Jay Treaty), Parry vol 52 (1969), 243. This includes an objective 
addressing cultural connections; Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea 
concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the area between the two Countries, including the Area 
Known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters, adopted 18 December 1978 (entered into force 15 February 1985), 
ATS 1985 No. 4 (hereafter cited as Torres Strait Treaty). This agreement protects traditional ways of life and 
livelihood of the traditional inhabitants of the islands and adjacent coastal areas of the Torres Strait. Some of its 
provisions worth noting are Article 10 that establishes a Protected Zone; Article 11 dealing with free movement 
and traditional activities including traditional fishing; and especially Article 12 that defines traditional customary 
rights in the following manner: : “[W]here the traditional inhabitants of one Party enjoy traditional customary 
rights of access to and usage of areas of land, seabed, seas, estuaries and coastal tidal areas that are in or in the 
vicinity of the Protected Zone and that are under the jurisdiction of the other Party, and those rights are 
acknowledged by the traditional inhabitants living in or in proximity to those areas to be in accordance with local 
tradition, the other Party shall permit the continued exercise of those rights on conditions not less favourable than 
those applying to like rights of its own traditional inhabitants.” 
103 Universal Declaration, n. 6 above, art 13. 
104 ILO 169 Convention, n. 15 above, art 32. 
105 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, art 36(1).  
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corresponding duty “in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, to 
take effective measures to facilitate the exercise and ensure the implementation 
of this right.”106  
 
The ILA has discussed the right of indigenous peoples to maintain relations 
across borders in three contexts under UNDRIP: right to (cultural) self-
determination, right to autonomy and self-government, and cultural rights and 
identity.107 In its Resolution No. 5/2012, the ILA recognised all three rights as 
forming part of customary international law. 108 In light of this and the “widely 
accepted position” confirmed by the inclusion of the provision across 
international instruments, the ILA has urged States to facilitate contacts between 
indigenous peoples belonging to the same cultural community that are divided by 
international borders.109  
 
In the event of a dispute between State Parties to UNCLOS with respect to 
mobility rights of indigenous peoples in transboundary ocean spaces, it is 
conceivable that an adjudicating body might turn to international human rights 
law for guidance and to find a rule to apply in this hypothetical scenario.110 It is 
instructive to observe, although rare, the instances of human mobility in maritime 
                                              
106 Id, art 36(2). The ILA lists examples of measures taken by States, either via changes in domestic law or through 
inter-State agreements at the bilateral and/or multilateral level, for instance the Nordic Saami Convention between 
Finland, Norway and Sweden. See ILA Interim Report n.19 at 15. See also Shin Imai and Kathryn Gunn, 
“Indigenous Belonging: Membership and Identity in the UNDRIP”, in UNDRIP Commentary n.3 above at 213-
246 specially 238.  
107  ILA Interim Report, n. 19 above, at 10 and 15. 
108 Resolution No.5/2012 n.40 above,  paras 4,5,6.  
109 Id. See also Imai and Gunn n.106 above.  
110  For instance, the Tribunal in Philippines v China noted “[W]here private rights are concerned, international 
law has long recognized that developments with respect to international boundaries and conceptions of 
sovereignty should, as much as possible, refrain from modifying individual rights.” It also quoted the Abyei 
Arbitraton Award, that “traditional rights, in the absence of an explicit agreement to the contrary, have usually 
been deemed to remain unaffected by any territorial delimitation.” Philippines v China, n. 64 above, paras 798-
799. See Abyei Arbitration (Government of Sudan v Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Final Award of 
22 June 2009, XXX RIAA 145, at 412, para 766. 
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boundary agreements addressed in the form of transboundary arrangements, 
including for traditional inhabitants.111   
 
 
Protection and preservation of the marine environment  
 
In light of the special ties of Indigenous peoples to the environment, UNDRIP 
has a special provision, Article 29 of UNDRIP which establishes “[I]ndigenous 
peoples have the right to the conservation and protection of the environment and 
the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources.”112 The 
obligation is further supported by secondary procedural duties.113 In a similar 
vein, Article 7(4) of the ILO 169 Convention provides that “[G]overnments shall 
take measures, in co-operation with the peoples concerned, to protect and 
preserve the environment of the territories they inhabit.”114 In this respect, the 
CBD is instructive as it sets out the framework for in situ conservation (also noted 
above) and maintains that State Parties have a duty to respect, preserve and 
                                              
111 For example: Torres Strait Treaty, n. 109 above, preamble and arts 16 and 18 which addressed among other 
freedom of movement of traditional inhabitants; Agreement between India and Sri Lanka on the Boundary in 
Historic Waters between the Two Countries and Related Matters, 26-28 June 1974 (in force 8 July 1974), Limits 
in the Seas no 66 (US Office of the Geographer, 21 December 1975). The latter agreement concerned the historic 
waters of Palk Bay. Two articles are of direct interest: 
Article 5  
Subject to the foregoing, Indian fishermen and pilgrims will enjoy access to visit Kachchativu as hitherto, 
and will not be required by Sri Lanka to obtain travel documents or visas for these purposes.  
Article 6  
The vessels of India and Sri Lanka will enjoy in each other's waters such rights as they have traditionally 
enjoyed therein. 
112 While Article 29 specifically deals with protection of the environment and that of the productive capacity of 
their lands or territories or resources, an argument can be made that this ties with other rights, for example cultural 
rights. The ILA Interim Report mentions ‘ecocide’ as adverse, irreparable alterations to the environment that 
threaten the existence of entire populations under Article 7(2) dealing with genocide. See ILA Interim Report, n. 
19 above, at 17. Also see Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, prepared by Mr. B. Whitaker, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, 2 July 1985, 17, para 33. This 
can be read (arguably) with art 194(5) of UNCLOS, n. 4 above, dealing with “measures taken to protect and 
preserve rare or fragile ecosystems”.  
113 These include assistance programmes for indigenous peoples for conservation and protection, ensuring no 
storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples without 
their free, prior and informed consent, and programmes for monitoring, maintaining and restoring the health of 
indigenous peoples. UNDRIP, n. 3 above, art 29. 
114 ILO 169 Convention, n 15 above.  
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maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous peoples115 and to 
encourage and develop methods of cooperation that include indigenous and 
traditional technologies in pursuance of the objectives of the CBD.116 In addition 
to giving effect to participatory and consultation mechanisms, this provision has 
been applied in conjunction with requirements of impact assessment in 
practice.117 It is only logical to read Article 29 of UNDRIP along with Article 
32(3) on States’ obligations concerning impact assessment: “… appropriate 
measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, 
cultural or spiritual impact”.118 Further, the ILA notes, UNDRIP’s provision on 
environmental protection (Article 29) should be read with general international 
environmental law.119 
 
As observed earlier, Article 192 of UNCLOS establishes a fundamental 
obligation for State Parties “to protect and preserve the marine environment.”120 
As the Philippines v China award concluded, this duty is further nourished by the 
larger corpus of international environmental law. The UNDRIP and ILO 169 
Convention provisions, although within the context of international human rights 
law, provide specific rules for the protection, conservation and sustainable use of 
the environment in the interest of an identified group of beneficiaries.121 This adds 
something to the more general duty in UNCLOS Article 192 and accordingly we 
argue that the environmental provisions contributed from international human 
                                              
115 CBD, n. 20 above, art 8(j). For a discussion on traditional knowledge under the CBD and UNDRIP, see Tobias 
Stoll, “Intellectual Property and Technologies” in UNDRIP Commentary at 614.  
116 Id, art 18(4).  
117 See Stefania Errico, “Control over Natural Resources and Protection of the Environment of Indigenous 
Territories”, in UNDRIP Commentary n.3 above at 425-460. 
118 Id at 453. Errico notes, “considerations related to the environmental impact of proposed activities in Indigenous 
territories and the consequent repercussions on the life, culture and livelihood of the concerned communities shall 
be part of the consultation and decision-making process required under the Declaration.”  
119 See ILA Interim Report, n. 19 above, at 24.  
120 UNCLOS, n. 4 above, art 192.  
121 See n. 78 above. See also Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol.II) adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development on 14 
June 1992, available online: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/outcomedocuments/agenda21>. See 
specifically Chapter 26, dedicated to “Recognizing and Strengthening the Role of Indigenous People and their 
communities”.  
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rights law ought to be considered integral to the corpus of international 
environmental law that informs Article 192. This entails an active duty to protect 
and preserve the marine environment upon which the enjoyment of indigenous 
peoples’ rights in international law depends. 
 
 
Marine scientific research  
 
UNDRIP establishes indigenous peoples’ right “to maintain, control, protect and 
develop their … traditional knowledge …, as well as the manifestations of their 
sciences, technologies …, including human and genetic resources, seeds, 
medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora …”.122 The right 
includes maintenance, control, protection and development of their intellectual 
property over traditional knowledge.123 This falls under the cluster of indigenous 
peoples’ cultural rights and identity.124 The ILA, in its Resolution No. 5/2012, 
recognises these rights as forming part of customary international law. 125 
 
 Accordingly, States have an obligation of conduct to take effective 
measures for the recognition and protection of the exercise of these indigenous 
                                              
122 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, art 31(1). Stoll comments, “Article 31 introduces a holistic concept of Indigenous culture 
and knowledge…. In context with other provisions of the UNDRIP, it can be seen to reflect existing, or to promote 
the emergence of new rules of customary international law…” See Stoll at n.115 above for a commentary on 
Article 31 UNDRIP on intellectual property and technologies.  
123 Id. 
124 A related provision that focusses on intangible cultural heritage is art 13(1) which includes… “the right of 
indigenous peoples to develop and transmit their oral traditions….and to designate and retain their own names for 
communities, places …” and it requires States to take effective measures to ensure protection of the right. 
Indigenous peoples indeed have their own place names and maps, for instance in the Canadian marine Arctic. See 
C. Aporta, “The Sea, the Land, the Coast, and the Winds: Understanding Inuit Sea Ice Use in Context,” in I. 
Krupnik et al (eds), SIKU: Knowing Our Ice -- Documenting Inuit Sea Ice Knowledge and Use (Springer, 2010), 
163–81. For more information on rights relating to culture under UNDRIP, see Alexandra Xanthaki, “Culture” in 
UNDRIP Commentary n.3 above at 273-298. 
125 See Resolution No.5/2012 n.40 above, paragraph 6. Earlier in the Interim Report, the ILA had noted: “the right 
to culture and its importance for the identity and development of individuals and communities is widely 
recognized by international treaties and jurisprudential or para-jurisprudential practice.” See ILA Interim Report, 
n.19 above, at 19, notes 109-110. Also see Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted 16 December 1966 (entered into force 3 January 1976), A/RES/21/2200 and 
so on. On the scope of the “right to culture” see Xanthaki id. at 284-285. 
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rights.126 Thus UNDRIP has introduced a further consideration in the regulation 
of scientific research and intellectual property products which potentially concern 
indigenous knowledge, science and technology in lands, territories and resources 
which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired, and 
which may include marine spaces.  
 
Against this backdrop, we argue that traditional knowledge is pertinent for the 
Marine Scientific Research (MSR) regime in UNCLOS.127  MSR in the internal 
waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea falls under the sovereignty of the 
coastal State and accordingly its regulation is a purely domestic prerogative.128 
Foreign research in such waters is a privilege, not a right. The regime of foreign 
MSR in the EEZ is substantially different and relies on the so-called ‘regime of 
consent’ set out in Part XIII of UNCLOS. The coastal State enjoys the exclusive 
rights to explore the living and non-living resources of the EEZ and the non-living 
resources and sedentary species of the continental shelf.129 MSR which is not 
resource-related may be conducted by other State Parties and international 
organizations in accordance with the principles and regime established for this 
purpose in UNCLOS, including subjecting foreign MSR to coastal State consent 
and regulation.130  Normally consent for MSR in the EEZ or on the continental 
shelf for the purpose to increase scientific knowledge of the marine environment 
and for peaceful purposes will be granted in accordance with coastal State rules 
and procedures,131 which may include procedures for consultations with 
indigenous peoples affected. Generally, consent is not to be delayed or denied 
                                              
126 Id, art 31(2). 
127 For instance, as the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment suggests, for the preparation of traffic maps to avoid 
‘user conflict’ over the same marine areas. See Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment at n.1 above, the chapter on 
Arctic marine infrastructure at 177. 
128 UNCLOS, n. 4 above, art 245. The Convention refers expressly only to the territorial sea, but given the legal 
status of internal and archipelagic waters implies exclusive authority to regulate MSR. 
129 Id, arts 56(1)(a) and 77. 
130 Id, art 246. 
131 Id, 246(3). 
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unreasonably.132 We argue that a meaningful but lengthy engagement process to 
ensure free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples affected by a 
foreign MSR permit application is not unreasonable.133 In the event a coastal State 
does not respond to an application for a permit or remains silent, the consent of 
the coastal State will be implied and the applicant State or international 
organization may proceed with MSR.134 
 
 An interesting question that arises is whether the free, prior and informed 
consent of indigenous peoples affected by a foreign MSR application has to be 
obtained as a legal duty. UNCLOS does not provide for exceptions. UNDRIP 
does not contain a provision expressly on point, but has two provisions that may 
be relevant. The first provides that “States shall consult and cooperate in good 
faith with the indigenous peoples concerned … in order to obtain their free, prior 
and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.”135 Insofar, as a foreign MSR 
permit can be characterised as an administrative measure, it is captured by this 
duty.  The second provision establishes that  
 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned … in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the 
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or 
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.136  
                                              
132 Id. 
133 In a Canadian case concerning an Inuit complaint regarding an MSR permit in Arctic waters granted to the 
German vessel Polarstern, it was argued successfully that the federal government failed to consult properly. See 
Qikiqtani Inuit Association v Canada (Minister of Natural Resources), 2010 NUCJ 12; Hamlet of Clyde River v 
TGS–NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA (TGS), 2015 FCA 17. For the background and commentary on these 
cases, see T. Rodon, “Offshore Development and Inuit Rights in Inuit Nunangat”, in C. Pélaudeix and E.M. Basse 
(eds), Governance of Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas, (Routledge, 2017), 169-185. 
134 UNCLOS, n. 4 above, art 256. 
135 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, art 19. According to Anaya, “a generally accepted principle exists in international law 
that indigenous peoples be consulted with respect to any decision affecting them.” See J. Anaya at n.89 above.  
136 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, art 32(2). 
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This provision is sufficiently broad to capture MSR activities as “any project”, 
most especially if there are resource implications. Thus States have a related 
procedural duty.137 Against this backdrop, and in a hypothetical scenario of 
proposed MSR that affects indigenous rights, the foreign MSR applicant ought to 
be aware of potential difficulties with the regime of implied consent, which may 
amount to no more than “constructive consent of the coastal State” and not 
necessarily backed by the “free, prior and informed consent” of indigenous 
peoples affected.138 Free, prior and informed consent and broader participatory 
and consultation rights of indigenous peoples fall under the remit of the right to 
autonomy and self-government, recognised as a norm of customary international 
law by the ILA in its Resolution No.5/2012, and also widely reflected in the 
practice of UN treaty supervisory bodies and State practice.139 
 
 A related question is whether the coastal State may refuse to grant foreign 
MSR permission because of objections from indigenous peoples affected by the 
proposed research. UNCLOS provides four bases for coastal States to withhold 
consent, namely if the project  
 
(a) is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources, whether living or non-living; 
(b) involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explosives or the 
introduction of harmful substances into the marine environment;  
                                              
137 “States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate 
measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.” Id, art 
32(3). According to the ILA, this would involve some form of recompense or profit-sharing for indigenous 
peoples, for instance through impact and benefit agreements. See ILA Interim Report, n. 19 above, 43.  
138  On FPIC, see Mauro Barelli, “Free, Prior and Informed Consent” in UNDRIP Commentary n.3 above at 268.  
“FPIC may have significantly different implications depending on the way in which it is read and understood”.    
139 See arts 6 and 7 of ILO Convention No. 169, n. 15 above. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination called upon States to “[E]nsure that members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect 
of effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests are taken 
without their informed consent.” CERD General Recommendation 23 on Indigenous Peoples, adopted 18 August 
1997, para 4(d), available online: < http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/genrexxiii.htm>. 
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(c) involves the construction, operation or use of artificial islands, 
installations and structures referred to in articles 60 and 80; 
(d) contains information communicated pursuant to article 248 regarding 
the nature and objectives of the project which is inaccurate or if the 
researching State or competent international organization has outstanding 
obligations to the coastal State from a prior research project.140 
 
Unless the research is of direct significance to resources or is potentially harmful 
to the environment, this text is fairly limited in providing bases for objecting on 
account of adverse impacts on indigenous peoples’ rights.  
 
 A provision that could assist coastal States’ implementation of participatory 
rights for their indigenous peoples with respect to MSR in the EEZ or on the 
continental shelf is Article 249(1), which concerns the duty of foreign MSR 
operators to comply with certain conditions such as the coastal State’s right to 
participate or be represented in the MSR project. The coastal State could use this 
provision to introduce conditions for the MSR permit to ensure participation by 
representatives of indigenous peoples and organizations. Participation could 
include presence on board research vessels and receipt of research reports and 
results.  
 
 UNDRIP, qua custom, could play a role in amplifying the regime of MSR 
and possibly also as informing good research ethics practices. From an UNDRIP 
perspective, the coastal State has a duty to act in the interests of indigenous 
peoples and not remain silent. And from an UNCLOS perspective, the coastal 
State also has a good faith duty towards MSR applicants and must not abuse its 
right to regulate such research.141   
                                              
140 UNCLOS, n. 4, art 246(5). 
141 Id, art 300. 
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Military activities 
 
While UNCLOS establishes a legal order that promotes peaceful uses of the 
oceans,142 military uses are a fact. Generally, warships enjoy international 
navigation rights and immunities from jurisdiction.143   
 
Article 30 of UNDRIP contains an innovative provision protecting 
indigenous rights from military activities by providing that such activities “shall 
not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by 
a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the 
indigenous peoples concerned,”144 and accompanied by a procedural duty to 
conduct effective consultations.145 It is interesting to observe that this provision 
does not appear to limit such activities to domestic military activities. Under 
UNCLOS, the coastal State is able to extend protection to indigenous uses of the 
territorial sea and archipelagic waters through the regime of innocent passage and 
by using its power to regulate passage.146 It is in the position to impose express 
restrictions on military activities which violate the rules governing innocent 
passage.147 Under UNDRIP, States “shall take the appropriate measures, 
                                              
142 Id, preamble and arts 88 and 301. 
143 Id, arts 32 and 95.  
144 UNDRIP, n.3 above, art 30. “UNDRIP is the first instrument on indigenous peoples’ rights which devotes a 
specific Article on military activities in indigenous peoples’ lands and territories…It tries to strike a balance 
between State security and public order issues on the one hand and indigenous peoples’ rights and interests on the 
other… As a general principle, it prohibits military activities in indigenous peoples’ territories but contemplates 
three exceptions… All the exceptions provided in Article 30 are conditional upon the realization of prior 
consultations..” Stefania Errico n.117 above at 454-455.  
145 Id, UNDRIP art 30. The ILA envisions this provision to fall under indigenous peoples’ land rights. See ILA 
Interim Report, n. 19 above at 24, note 133. ILA Resolution No. 5/2012 recognizes land rights as forming part of 
customary international law. See ILA Resolution No.5/2012 n.40 above, para 7.  
146 See UNCLOS Articles 22 and 53. 
147 Id. For example, UNCLOS, id, art 19 which defines innocent passage as navigation which is not prejudicial to 
the peace, good order and security of the coastal State, and accordingly certainly activities are considered 
prejudicial, such as threat or use of force, exercises or practice with weapons, collecting information prejudicial 
to the defense of the coastal State, launching, landing or taking on board aircraft or military devices and interfering 
with communications systems. Under art 30 the coastal State may require a foreign warship that does not comply 
with the laws and regulations concerning passage to leave the territorial sea immediately. 
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including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.”148 The 
ILA notes that complaints to international courts (and mechanisms set-up for the 
purpose) regarding use of indigenous peoples’ lands and territories for military 
activities have been resolved in favour of indigenous peoples’ rights.149 
 
The extent to which protection can be extended to indigenous uses in the 
EEZ, where they exist, is less clear. Where they exist in the EEZ, one would need 
to overcome the difficulty of characterising areas of the EEZ as ‘lands’ and 
‘territories’. Further, the EEZ is subject to particular freedoms of the high seas, 
including navigation.150 There is controversy as to whether all military activities, 
as distinct from mere navigation by warships, can be considered ‘internationally 
lawful uses’ related to the freedom of navigation of the high seas.151 One observer 
suggests that the UNCLOS may not have the final word on this matter given that 
there is a growing practice of coastal States that require consent.152 It is pertinent 
to observe that UNCLOS has introduced a duty on States in the EEZ to pay “due 
regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State” and to “comply with the laws 
and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not 
incompatible with this Part.”153 Where indigenous lands and territories can be 
demonstrated to include areas of the EEZ, it is conceivable that the coastal State’s 
sovereign resource rights and jurisdiction for MSR and environment protection 
                                              
148 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, art 38. Article 38 is applied on a case-by-case basis, in a variety of contexts. See Willem 
van Genugten and Federico Lenzerini, “Legal Implementation and International Cooperation and Assistance: 
Articles 37-42” in UNDRIP Commentary at 539-572. 
149 Under UN Treaty bodies and the Inter-American human rights system. See ILA Interim Report, n. 19 above, 
24, note 133.  
150 UNCLOS, n. 2, art 58(1). 
151 Nandan and Rosenne, n. 95 above, 564; see also Proelss’ comments in Alexander Proelss (ed), United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary (CH Beck, 2017), 453. 
152 “It seems doubtful, however, that the limited approach taken by the Convention on the issue of military 
activities can be regarded as the final word, taking into account the growing body of State practice requiring prior 
consent for the performance of naval military exercises. In light of this, it may simply be impossible today to come 
to a conclusive answer on whether military activities reaching beyond mere passage or overflight are covered by 
Art, 58(1).” Proelss, id, at 453. 
153 UNCLOS, n. 4 above, art 58(3). 
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could provide a basis for the protection of indigenous interests, on the basis of 
other rules of international law’ (i.e., UNDRIP qua custom), and to expect 
compliance on the basis of the due regard duty.154  
 
Technical assistance and capacity-building 
 
UNDRIP provides for the capacity-building of indigenous peoples to enable them 
to enjoy their rights by providing a right to access financial and technical 
assistance.155 UN organizations and intergovernmental organizations are singled 
out to mobilize financial cooperation and technical assistance, as well as “[W]ays 
and means of ensuring participation of indigenous peoples on issues affecting 
them shall be established.”156 The ILA has noted an entire category of rights of 
indigenous peoples to development and international cooperation.157 
 
The UNCLOS provisions on technical assistance are primarily concerned 
with aiding developing States with respect to MSR, marine technology 
cooperation (including with respect to activities in the international seabed 
area).158 On face value, these provisions do not appear to interface with UNDRIP. 
What is of more significance is the UNDRIP expectation that indigenous peoples 
be provided with assistance by international organizations to enjoy their rights 
and the expectation of these organizations, including those that are designated 
                                              
154 On the due regard duty see Julia Gaunce, “On the Interpretation of the General Duty of ‘Due Regard’”, Ocean 
Yearbook 32, no.1 (2018): 27-59.  
155 UNDRIP, n. 1, art 39. For a scholarly interpretation, see Willem van Genugten and Federico Lenzerini, n.148 
above.  
156 Id, UNDRIP art 41.  
157 ILA Interim Report, n. 19 above, 36-38.  “The ‘right to development’ can be conceived according to a twofold 
perspective. First, a substantive right to development based on self-determination and/or active and equal 
participation embodied in Article 23 (indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and 
strategies for exercising their right to development); second, a procedural right to development under Article 39 
aimed at facilitating the implementation of the other rights enshrined in the Declaration. Owing to the complexity 
of development processes, the State alone cannot establish the ideal environment for the full realisation of human 
rights. This is a task that requires cooperation from the entire international community, particularly international 
institutions.” See also Genugten and Lenzerini, id.  
158 In UNCLOS, n. 4 above, Parts XIII and XIV. See especially arts 202, 203, 266, 269, 274 and 275. 
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‘competent international organizations’ by UNCLOS, to ensure their 
participation on issues that affect them. For example, in recent years the IMO, as 
the organization in UNCLOS responsible for international shipping, has 
deliberated on several issues potentially affecting indigenous peoples, such as the 
development of the Polar Code, and yet there is no evidence that efforts were 
exerted to involve indigenous peoples of the Arctic, which happen to have 
organizations that represent them.159 In calling for the promotion of inclusive 
participation of indigenous peoples, UNDRIP speaks directly to international 
organizations and does not rely on States only to represent the interests of 
indigenous peoples.  
 
Good faith 
 
In implementing UNDRIP, States are expected to “consult and cooperate in good 
faith” and to obtain the “free, prior and informed consent” of indigenous peoples 
in legislating and administration.160 Indigenous peoples have “the right to the 
recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other 
constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have 
States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive 
arrangements.”161 The ILA notes that “the enforcement of this right is 
inextricably linked to the various provisions of UNDRIP that guarantee access to 
                                              
159 There are six federations of indigenous organizations that enjoy the status of Permanent Participants in the 
Arctic Council, namely: Aleut International Association (AIA); Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC); Gwich'in 
Council International (GCI); Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC); Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the 
North (RAIPON); and Saami Council (SC). See Sambo Dorough, n. 36 above.  The remarks of IMO’s Secretary 
General at a recently concluded conference on the Implementation of the Polar Code are on point: “I am convinced 
about listening to the voice of indigenous peoples. Increased maritime activity has an obvious potential impact on 
Arctic indigenous peoples and communities who depend on the marine environment for food … hunting, fishing 
and other traditional ways are central to the survival of their culture.”- Keynote address by the IMO’s Secretary 
General, Mr Kitack Lim, International Conference on Harmonized Implementation of the Polar Code, organised 
by the Finnish Transport Safety Agency, more information available online: 
<https://www.trafi.fi/en/polarcode1year>. 
160 UNDRIP, n. 3, art 19. Article 19, as noted above, falls under indigenous peoples’ right to autonomy and self-
government.  
161 Id, art 37.  
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just and fair redress or resolution of conflicts and disputes.”162 In its Resolution 
No.5/2012, the ILA recognises both treaty rights as well as the rights of 
indigenous peoples to reparation and redress as forming part of customary 
international law.163 Further, UNDRIP “shall be interpreted in accordance with 
the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-
discrimination, good governance and good faith.”164 These provisions should 
inform the coastal State’s exercise of rights and performance of obligations in 
UNCLOS which have a bearing on indigenous rights. 
 
 UNCLOS provides for State Parties to fulfil their obligations in good faith 
and to exercise their rights and freedoms in a manner that does not amount to an 
abuse of right.165 It is arguable that, as between State Parties, these intertwined 
duties which encumber the exercise of rights and performance of duties 
throughout the Convention apply to the areas of potential interface between 
UNDRIP and UNCLOS.  
 
Dispute settlement 
 
The ILA, in its Resolution No.5/2012 and the Interim Report, describes the 
customary international law status of the right of indigenous peoples to reparation 
and redress for the wrongs suffered166 and in the following words: “[I]ndigenous 
peoples have recourse to domestic courts and States have a duty to ensure access 
to just and fair procedures and remedies for the resolution of conflicts, taking into 
consideration “the customs, traditions, rules and legal systems of the indigenous 
peoples concerned and international human rights.”167  
                                              
162 ILA Interim Report, n.19 above, 52.  
163 See ILA Resolution No.5/2012 n.40 above, paras 9 and 10.  
164 UNDRIP, n. 3 above, art 46. 
165 UNCLOS, n. 4 above, art 300. 
166 See ILA Interim Report, n. 19 above, at 40-43, 53.  
167 UNDRIP, n. 1 above, art 40. 
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UNDRIP does not address the situation of a dispute between States 
concerning the existence, interpretation and application of indigenous rights. It is 
conceivable that such disputes could arise in the law of the sea, perhaps in similar 
scenarios to maritime boundary cases where traditional or historic fishing rights 
were at issue.168  Where issues of interpretation and application of provisions of 
UNCLOS relate to indigenous rights, and there is disagreement among interested 
State Parties, the Convention provides options for dispute settlement. Naturally, 
such disputes would have to arise under the right factual matrix, such as, for 
example, the exercise of indigenous rights supported by the host State that affect 
the interests of another State Party, or possibly a coastal State excusing its conduct 
which appears inconsistent with provisions of the Convention, but on account of 
its efforts to protect indigenous rights. Such a situation could arise with respect 
to an allegation by a researching State that with respect to a specific MSR project 
the coastal State is not exercising its rights in a manner compatible with the 
Convention.169 Our purpose here is not to identify all possible dispute scenarios, 
but rather to consider what the options for dispute settlement might be from a 
theoretical perspective.  
 
In Part XV UNCLOS provides a comprehensive system for the settlement 
of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention. State 
Parties can choose any peaceful means of their choice. They have a range of third 
party-assisted options to choose from, where direct bilateral diplomacy fails to 
resolve the dispute, such as conciliation, adjudication under the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) or International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), 
                                              
168 On historic fishing rights, see Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment ICJ Reports 
18 (1982); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain), 
Merits ICJ Reports 40 (2001); Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings between 
Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation), XXII Reports of International Arbitral Awards. 
169 UNCLOS, n. 4, art 297(2)(b). 
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and arbitration under annexes VII and VIII of UNCLOS, or even outside the 
framework of the Convention, for example under the auspices of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration or other ad hoc arbitration process. State Parties may express 
their preference on ratification or accession or at any time thereafter.170 The 
system operates on the basis of compulsory and optional procedures. Pending 
resolution of a dispute, provisional measures may be adopted by a court or 
tribunal.171 A provision under another treaty or convention in force between the 
disputants, such as ILO 169 may also be considered and UNCLOS empowers the 
ITLOS to entertain such cases.172  
 
It is possible that a dispute that concerns indigenous rights could be subject 
to the compulsory procedures or may be subject to any of the listed limitations 
and exceptions. For example, a dispute concerning the MSR procedures are 
subject to the compulsory procedures, except that the coastal State is not obliged 
to submit to the procedure when the dispute concerns the exercise of its right or 
discretion in accordance with the regulatory framework in Article 246 or where 
the dispute concerns its decision to suspend or cease an MSR project under 
Article 253, such as where there is non-compliance with the permitting terms.173 
In the event of disputes under these two provisions, there is compulsory 
conciliation in accordance with Annex V, except that the conciliation cannot 
question the exercise of the coastal State’s discretion under the two provisions.174 
This is interesting from an UNDRIP perspective because it provides the coastal 
State with substantial leeway in setting permitting terms or withdrawing MSR 
permits when indigenous rights may be affected. There are similar qualifications 
                                              
170 Id, art 287. 
171 Id, art 290. 
172 Id,, annex VI art 22. 
173 Id,, art 297(2)(a). 
174 Id, art 297(2)(b). 
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for fisheries disputes, protection of particular coastal State rights and possible 
resort to conciliation.175  
 
It is conceivable that the maritime boundary dispute may concern in part the 
weight to be given to indigenous uses of the area in dispute. In the past, there 
have been maritime boundary disputes that were resolved while recognizing 
transboundary resource use rights.176 In another class of disputes in Part XV, 
concerning maritime boundary delimitation (as well historic titles and historic 
bay disputes), a State Party may exempt such disputes from compulsory 
settlement if it expresses such an intention on becoming a party or at any time 
thereafter.177  In such cases, a compulsory conciliation procedure remains 
applicable and the disputants are expected to negotiate an agreement based on the 
commission’s report. A recent conciliation procedure was successful in assisting 
States in resolving their maritime boundary dispute.178 If no agreement is reached, 
they may still resort to a third-party procedure of their choice, but naturally only 
if they agree. A final class of disputes that a State may opt to exempt from the 
dispute settlement procedures would be those concerning military activities and 
law enforcement.179 Clearly, in the latter case a dispute concerning the impact of 
military activities on indigenous rights may be excluded, if the State conducting 
military activities chooses to do so. 
 
It is possible there may be conflicts between a coastal State and another State 
concerning a matter in the EEZ over which UNCLOS has not attributed rights or 
                                              
175 Id, art 297(3). 
176 For example Eritrea v Yemen, n. 100 above and Torres Strait Treaty, n. 109 above. See S. M. Weldehaimanot 
and D. R. Mekonnen, “Favourable Awards to Transboundary Indigenous Peoples”, Australian Indigenous Law 
Review 16, no.1 (2012): 60-76. 
177 UNCLOS, n. 4 above, art 298(a).  
178 Australia and Timor-Leste recently concluded a successful conciliation process under Annex V of UNCLOS. 
See Conciliation between the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste and the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Permanent Court of Arbitration Press Release (9 May 2018), available online: 
<https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2358>.  
179 UNCLOS, n. 4 above, art 298(b). 
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jurisdiction to a State. A hypothetical example concerns transboundary 
movement of indigenous peoples through territorial seas and EEZs, as in the case 
of the Arctic. In such instances, the Convention provides for such conflicts to be 
resolved “on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, 
taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved to the 
parties as well as to the international community as a whole”.180 This provision 
appears to open the possibility to consider indigenous practices and rights under 
UNDRIP as constituting relevant circumstances to be given weight in reaching 
an equitable solution.  
 
Once a case is admitted, the applicable law to a dispute under UNCLOS 
includes, in addition to the Convention itself, other rules of international law not 
incompatible with it,181 which arguably could include the general international 
law concerning indigenous rights.182 The power of an international court or 
tribunal to decide a case ex aequo et bono is also potentially relevant.183 
Procedurally, amicus curiae briefs on behalf of indigenous peoples may be a good 
device not only for their participation (especially since they are not a ‘party’ to a 
dispute while it might still affect their interests), but for the tribunal to take all 
relevant dimensions of the dispute into account.184  
 
 
                                              
180 Id, art 59. See also n.154 above.  
181 Id, art 293(1). Article 311 as mentioned in n. 72 above deals with compatibility of UNCLOS with ‘other 
agreements’.  
182 As an analogy, Christina Binder’s comments on UNDRIP as applicable law in the context of international 
investment disputes are worth considering: “….Typical choice-of-law clauses in investment treaties refer to the 
law of the host country and such rules of international law as are applicable. Tribunals could thus draw upon 
relevant instruments for the protection of Indigenous rights as part of the applicable international law of treaties 
(eg. ILO Convention 169) or as applicable customary international law. Especially for the latter, the UNDRIP’s 
codification of relevant rights seems important. In a similar vein, tribunals could also apply Indigenous rights as 
part of the law of the host State.” See n.14 above. In an UNCLOS context, law of the host State could be replaced 
by law of the coastal State. 
183 Id, art 293(2). See also Statute of the International Court of Justice, adopted 26 June 1945 (entered into force 
24 October 1945), 3 Bevans 1179, art 38(2).  
184 Adopted and modified from Binder’s suggestion on Amicus curiae participation in investment proceedings. 
See Binder n.14 above at 104. 
48 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this reflective article we raised the question whether there is a relationship 
between UNDRIP and UNCLOS where provisions of the two instruments 
potentially overlap or interact on specific subject-matter. We argued there is a 
potential relationship.  
 
We recognize that the two instruments have different levels of 
authoritativeness, that UNCLOS is a major multilateral convention, whereas 
UNDRIP is an UNGA resolution which per se is not legally binding. We further 
observed that to the extent UNDRIP’s provisions reflect customary international 
law, the customary norms they may codify potentially produce legal 
consequences for the overlapping subject-matter in UNCLOS. Although we 
discuss specific UNDRIP provisions in some depth and draw on authoritative 
opinion concerning their status, we refrained from concluding on their precise 
legal status. Such an assessment would require a lengthier and more in-depth 
study. Rather, we hypothesized that assuming the UNDRIP provisions concerned 
are considered to reflect customary norms, there is arguably interesting potential 
relationships to particular provisions of UNCLOS, naturally in the right factual 
matrix where ocean uses intertwine with indigenous rights.  
 
We see two potential roles for UNDRIP in the law of the sea. The first is a 
potential supplementary role for such customary norms through the preambular 
pathway that matters not regulated by UNCLOS continue to be governed by the 
rules and principles of general international law. The second is a further potential 
interpretative role for UNDRIP customary norms in contributing to the corpus of 
international environmental law that informs the interpretation of the general duty 
of States to protect and preserve the marine environment.  
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At this stage and as we noted at the outset, our enquiry is preliminary and 
exploratory of specific issues, but we would expect that as long as our premises 
hold, there are possibly other rights and duties in the Convention whose 
interpretation in the contemporary international law context could benefit from 
consideration of UNDRIP provisions. Through this reflective piece we hope to 
inspire additional paths of enquiry and research, such as case studies of actual and 
emerging practices, comparative consideration of domestic legislation and court 
decisions.  
 
